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Asbestos is a commonly occurring mineral fiber replete with industrial uses due
to its durable and fire-retardant properties. Its characteristics make it an ideal
component in a wide range of manufactured goods including building materials,
automobile parts, heat-resistant fabrics, packing, gaskets, and coatings.
Unfortunately, when asbestos-containing materials are disrupted, microscopic fibers
become airborne and can be inhaled into the lungs, causing potentially fatal injuries
upon prolonged exposure.' The widespread use of asbestos in industrial and
residential settings through the early 1970s exposed millions of American workers to
the useful but hazardous product, and has resulted in the longest-running mass tort
litigation in United States history.2
By 2002, of the millions of Americans exposed to asbestos during the twentieth
century, approximately 730,000 had filed an asbestos claim against a total of at least
8,400 entities named as asbestos defendants.3 It is further estimated that a total of
$70 billion has been spent adjudicating these claims, with transaction costs on both
sides of the litigation totaling approximately $40 billion, leaving only $30 billion in
estimated net compensation to claimants.4
Asbestos litigation has significantly contributed to the evolution of mass civil
litigation, as the complexity of the issues and difficulties with respect to judicial case
management have forced judges to come up with innovative solutions to more
efficiently handle the caseloads thereby reducing private and public transaction
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Notre Dame Law School.
1. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 11-13 (2005) (outlining the most prevalent
injuries resulting from asbestos exposure). "Mesothelioma is a cancer of the lining of the chest or abdomen.
Asbestos is the only demonstrated cause of mesothelioma, although some mesothelioma cases have not been
traceable to an asbestos exposure.... The disease is regarded as inevitably fatal, usually within a year or two
of diagnosisFalseOther cancers have also been linked to asbestos, although they all have other causes besides
asbestos exposure. Aside from mesothelioma, lung cancer is the most frequently claimed malignant disease. ...
Other cancers asserted by asbestos claimants include leukemia, and cancers of the bladder, breast, colon,
esophagus, kidney, larynx, lip, liver, lymphoid, mouth, pancreas, prostate, rectum, stomach, throat, thyroid, and
tongueFalseAsbestosis is a chronic lung disease resulting from inhalation of asbestos fibers that can be
debilitating and even fatal. However, a person diagnosed with asbestosis might be asymptomatic or only mildly
impaired." Id. The report was conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, a unit of the RAND
Corporation, and is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series, which presents major research findings
that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. Id. at iii.
2. Id. at 11, 21.
3. Id. at 70, 79.
4. Id. at 88.
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costs.5  During the early years of asbestos litigation, asbestos manufacturers
vigorously defended claims and raised numerous defenses, preventing many
plaintiffs' attorneys from finding the cases economically feasible to bring.6 Plaintiff
law firms eventually discovered that asbestos defendants were willing to settle when
the firms took advantage of group litigation-filing a large number of claims,
grouping them together, and then negotiating with defendants on behalf of the entire
group.
7
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected class certification sought by a proposed
class action seeking a global settlement of current and future asbestos-related claims
for a proposed class "encompass[ing] hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of
individuals."8 The Court's decision hinged in large part on finding the requirement
of adequacy of representation unsatisfied when present and future class members had
conflicting interests: "for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous
immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs
in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future."9 While the Court's
ultimate conclusion to withhold certification might have been correct,10 the decision
nevertheless prevented a potential class encompassing millions of people from
aggregating their claims to take advantage of the benefits of group litigation without
delineating any clear standard for what a realistic conception of adequacy of
representation requires.
Despite recognizing the significant implications and hardships imposed by not
certifying the class, the Court failed to conduct any inquiry into how the competing
interests of present and future plaintiffs could be satisfied by the proposed global
5. See id at 21, 28; see also discussion infra Part II.B (discussing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997), both as the last word on adequacy of representation in class action lawsuits and as having
promulgated a standard of adequate representation so difficult to meet that class actions have become
inordinately difficult to certify).
6. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 1, at 22-23 (explaining the initial uncertainty of applying substantive
legal doctrines to latent injuries). For example, "each claim required the presentation of scientific evidence on
the causal link between asbestos exposure and disease, plus extensive factual investigation to demonstrate a
causal link between the specific plaintiffs injury and the defendant's products, meaning that asbestos claims
were far more expensive to prosecute than ordinary personal injury claims." Id. at 22. Furthermore, "[t]he
defendants were large corporations that could afford to invest in protracted litigation and to adopt aggressive
litigation strategies in response to plaintiffs' suits." Id.
7. See id at 23 ("Often, defendants would agree to settle all of the claims that were so grouped, including
weaker as well as stronger claims, to reduce their overall costs of litigation. By agreeing to pay weaker smaller-
value claims in exchange for settling stronger and larger-value claims, defendants could also contain their
financial risk.").
8. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
9. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 595.
10. See discussion infra Part II.B. (the proposed global settlement in Amchem would have the result of
preventing some far-future plaintiffs from getting any recovery at all); see also Francis E. McGovern, The
Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REv. 1721 (2002) (explaining that asbestos litigation is a
paradigmatic example of Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" concept). "The classic commons problem is
exemplified by the overuse of a public good driven by rational decisionmaking on the part of users who have
no individual disincentives to restrain their use because the detriments of their actions are collective, not
individual, in nature." Id. at 1722. In the context of asbestos litigation, if there is a limited fund of money
accessible to asbestos plaintiffs, and no restriction on their access to that fund, then it will become depleted
before all claimants have been compensated.
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settlement.11 Instead of taking into consideration how the competing interests of
present plaintiffs and future plaintiffs balanced against one another, the Court
pronounced a rigid and simplistic holding declaring representation inadequate
whenever there are conflicting interests among class members.12  This overly
reductionist holding misses the point: there will always be conflicting interests in
class actions. The real issue-if class actions are going to be considered a realistic
procedural device for social benefit-is when are the conflicts so bad that courts
should be unwilling to tolerate them.13 The Court failed to ask that question over
fifteen years ago in Amchem, and exploring the deficiencies of Amchem sheds light
on why a better understanding of adequacy of representation is necessary before class
actions can be considered a serious procedural device for litigants. 14
By granting certiorari in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,'5 the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to clarify the meaning of adequacy of representation by
articulating a more realistic and workable standard. The question before the court
was whether a class representative can defeat a defendant's right of removal under
the Class Action Fairness Act of 200516 ("CAFA") by binding absent putative class
members using a "stipulation," filed with the class action complaint, limiting the
damages sought for the absent putative class members to less than the $5 million
threshold for federal jurisdiction, despite the fact that absent the stipulation, the actual
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.' 7  Put in terms of adequacy of
representation: can the class representatives satisfy their duty to adequately represent
the interests of putative class members when stipulating to a lower damage amount
in order to prevent removal to federal court?
The Supreme Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity Knowles
presented to clarify the requirement of adequate representation in class actions.
Instead, the Court rejected Knowles's ability to use the stipulation to avoid federal
jurisdiction on the narrowest grounds possible by holding the question of adequate
representation cannot be asked until the class seeks certification.'" The Court,
through Justice Breyer, construed the issue as "whether the stipulation makes a
critical difference"' 9 in defeating CAFA jurisdiction. The Court found the stipulation
11. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629-30 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
discussion infra Part II.B.
12. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594-95.
13. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating
Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465, 1468-69 (1998) (discussing the reality that in nonconsensual
litigation-such as class actions-in which litigants do not have an engagement agreement with the attorney,
conflicts of interest are going to occur). "[W]e think that Amchem, if it in fact establishes a strict 'no conflicts'
rule for class actions, is unworkable and wrong. Conflicts of interests and associated tradeoffs among plaintiffs
are an unavoidable part of all group lawsuits and all group settlements. There being no way to eliminate conflicts
from multiple-claimant representations, the only question is how to deal with them." Id.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. 133 S.Ct. 1345 (2013) (in which Justice Breyer delivered an opinion for a unanimous court on the
narrowest grounds possible, thus leaving the uncertainty created by Amchem intact).
16. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
17. See Brief for Petitioner, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345 (2013) (No. 11-1450).
18. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. at 1348-49.
19. Id. at 1348.
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could not bind putative class members because Knowles "does not speak for those he
purports to represent" because "a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot
legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified." 20 "Because
his precertification stipulation does not bind anyone but himself, Knowles has not
reduced the value of the putative class members' claims." 21 Despite failing to clarify
adequacy of representation, the Court did acknowledge the importance of adequacy
to the question presented by Knowles's stipulation and implicitly recognized its
relevance for the future effect of the Court's holding.22
The Court's holding should have been critical to the future of class actions for
two reasons. As the Court's first CAFA case-coming some seven years after
CAFA's enactment-the Court was examining for the first time the balance CAFA
strikes between promoting the beneficial uses of class actions against their potential
for abuse. The Court addressed "whether CAFA is a strong remedy for state court
abuses in class actions, as Congress expressly intended, or if it has a loophole that
allows plaintiffs' lawyers to easily avoid federal jurisdiction." 23 By not allowing
Knowles's nonbinding stipulation to be considered binding by federal district courts,
the Court recognized its holding is consistent with promoting "CAFA's primary
objective: ensuring 'Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance."' 24 Second, the Court had the opportunity to resolve the case along
adequacy of representation grounds and to clarify the uncertainty created by Amchem.
Amchem has left too many issues unresolved and has left the bar for satisfying
adequacy of representation so high that clarifying CAFA may not even matter if
putative classes are unable to be certified under Amchem's overly demanding
standard. By failing to say anything meaningful about adequacy, the Supreme Court
did the procedural device of the class action a disservice, and made it clear that the
Court does not appear ready to tackle the meaning of adequate representation any
time soon.
The inherent complexities of the issues involved in class actions necessitate a
functional approach that balances the facts and circumstances of each particular case
to determine whether a putative class has satisfied the requirement of adequate
representation. There is no one-size-fits-all formula for determining whether
adequacy of representation is satisfied. With that in mind, this Note proposes a
rulemaking alternative to the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence that will enable
class actions to become a realistic option for litigants again and begins to examine
the contours of such an alternative. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should amend Rule 2325 to add a subsection codifying a
functional, multi-factor test for courts to apply in determining whether a putative
20. Id. at 1349.
21. Id.
22. Id. (explaining that because stipulations must be binding and a named plaintiff cannot bind
precertification class members, Knowles's stipulation is in effect contingent, and "a court might find that
Knowles is an inadequate representative due to the artificial cap he purports to impose on the class' recovery").
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345 (2013) (No.
11-1450).
24. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. at 1350.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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class has met the standard of adequate representation.
In outlining such an argument, this Note examines various ways in which the
constitutional imperative of "adequate representation" can be understood for the
purpose of providing an argument capable of defending a more liberal approach to
finding representation adequate in the class action context. Traditional western
philosophical doctrines, the work of scholars, and practical considerations will be
explored to determine whether they can provide insight into how a court may be able
to find representation adequate in a wider array of cases to achieve the goals of class
actions. By providing such an argument, the Note makes an implicit argument for
certifying more class actions in the interest of achieving justice and efficiency for
more litigants. A consequence of this normative argument is the realization that the
Supreme Court's decision in Amchem is wholly inadequate for treating class actions
as a serious procedural device.
Part II discusses broadly the goals of class actions that underlie the functional
approach outlined in this Note. Part II also analyzes the modern class action,
including an examination of the purpose and goals to be achieved by CAFA. Part III
lays the foundation for a functional, multi-factor approach to adequacy undergirded
by traditional western philosophical doctrines and theories propounded by scholars.
II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
Class actions provide the opportunity for group litigation of claims when the
parties are so numerous that joinder is "impracticable." 26 When appropriate, class
actions allow potentially massive groups of individuals to bind themselves together
to have each of their legally cognizable claims litigated as one.27 One of the clearest
benefits of class actions is decreased transaction costs, leading to efficiency and
justice for litigants. Properly employed, class actions minimize attorneys' fees while
maximizing judicial economy and justice-by achieving recovery for as large a
group of people as possible as efficiently and easily as possible. Class actions also
allow individuals with meritorious claims to litigate claims that would be
economically infeasible to bring individually but which promote one of the law's
fundamental goals by bringing as a class: deterring wrongdoing. 28
The class action is not a new procedural device. Most scholarly accounts trace
the origin of class actions to the late twelfth century, when a rector in Nuthampstead,
England sued four of his parishioners-acting as class representatives for the rest-
26. Id. R. 23(a)(1) (stating that a prerequisite to any class action is that "the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable").
27. See id. R. 23(a)(l)-(4) (delineating the standard for certifying a class action). Rule 23(a) states that
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Id.
28. The so-called "negative-value" class action occurs when the value of an individual's recovery is less
than the costs of bringing the case-no rational person would bring the case individually, but as part of a class,
the case becomes worthwhile.
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to collect burial fees he felt were owed to him.29 Despite its medieval roots, class
actions remain a deeply unsettled area of law. Balancing the interests of fairness and
finality in the judicial process with the efficiency to be had through class actions
creates an uncertain tension that currently prevents many putative classes from group
litigation. One of the more salient problems currently preventing class litigation is
the requirement of adequate representation.30
A. The Goals of Class Actions
Over the years, commentators have listed a number of reasons for why we have
class actions. What follows are five of the most common goals to be achieved by the
class action device.
1. Deterrence Through Internalizing Costs
From an economic standpoint, a fundamental purpose of the law is to punish
wrongdoers by forcing them to pay for the harm they cause. "Knowing that they will
fully internalize the costs of their wrongs, rational economic actors then have an
incentive to take the proper amount of care when deciding how to act."31
Furthermore, if one takes as a normative premise that the law ought to promote
individuals' well-being, then "the law should seek to minimize the sum of accident
costs-specifically, the total costs of precautions against accident, unavoidable harm,
risk-bearing, and administration of the legal system."32 The ability on the part of
prospective plaintiffs to bring a class action against a defendant contributes to the
law's normative aim of deterring wrongdoing on the part of would-be defendants
because as rational actors those defendants can internalize the expected costs of their
wrongs by taking proper precautions beforehand. Class actions help mediate the
29. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective
Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997).
30. See FED.R.CIV.P. 23(a)(4) (stating that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class").
31. JAY TIDMARSH, CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY § 1.03[2],
at 11 (2014).
32. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115
HARV. L. REv. 831, 831-32 (2002).
33. For an argument that takes the deterrence rationale to the extreme, see id. at 833-840 and 843-44.
Professor Rosenberg goes a step further by making a normative argument for adjudicating mass tort cases by
using mandatory-litigation class actions because such a system "best deters accidents and insures against
accident risks, thus securing maximum individual welfare ex ante." Id. at 839. His argument "proceeds from
the premises that the legal system should aim to improve individuals' well-being and that individuals seek to
maximize their own welfare. In short, in the face of accident risks, the legal system should do what an individual
seeking maximum welfare would prefer." Id. at 840. His central conclusion is that "only mandatory-litigation
class action enables the aggregation and averaging of claims that maximizes benefits from scale economies-
especially by motivating the optimal investment of legal resources-and from redistribution of claim-related
wealth to achieve optimal deterrence and insurance from mass tort liability." Id. "Optimal tort deterrence
threatens firms with liability for the total costs of their tortious conduct. In so doing, it provides firms ex ante
with the financial incentive to invest efficiently in precautions. Firms invest efficiently when they incur costs
for precautions up to the point at which the expense of taking an additional unit of precaution exceeds the benefit
of the additional risk involved. Optimal deterrence thus prevents unreasonable risk-risk that costs society more
to incur than to avoid-thereby maximizing society's total welfare and each individual's ex ante expected net
2013-14] 169
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preferences of individuals without a need for class litigation with those who do by
striving for an optimal level of deterrence. By aggregating many claims, class actions
change a defendant's calculation regarding how much care to take.
2. Lowering Transaction Costs
Transaction costs-such as the costs of litigation represented by the expense of
prosecuting or defending a claim-pose a very real constraint on the enforcement of
legal rights. While transaction costs are unavoidable, class actions allow litigants to
achieve economies of scale, spreading the costs of the litigation across the entire
class.34 One of the purposes of having procedural devices-such as class actions-
is to reduce transaction costs on both sides of litigation: "[t]he goal is to economize
on litigation expenditures and court time."35 According to Judge Posner, the modem
class action generalizes a technique "for aggregating a number of small claims into
one large enough to justify the costs of suit-or, stated otherwise, for realizing
economies of scale in litigation."36
3. Balancing Incentives to Invest in Litigation
Traditional one-on-one litigation is accompanied by a free-rider problem when
many plaintiffs have related claims. 37  Plaintiffs are discouraged from optimal
investment in litigation, which skews outcomes in favor of defendants "who have an
incentive to invest heavily in outcome-influencing litigation expenses, and against
individual victims, who do not."38 Professor David Rosenberg has analyzed the
problem of unequal incentives for investment in litigation in the greatest detail, and
he argues the solution to skewed investment incentives is to allow aggregation of
plaintiff's claims.39 "Hence, class actions help both sides to make rational investment
decisions about the amount to spend on the litigation. Put in less formal language,
class actions meet power with power."40
4. Obtaining Closure-On Both Sides of Litigation
Unlike traditional litigation, class actions have the unusual ability to end a
controversy once and for all. Both victims and defendants are benefitted by such a
scheme, as victims are given recovery and markets are able to manage risk through
class actions by placing limits on a company's exposure-often when the company
settles the claims. "A class-action settlement allows the company to cap its exposure
welfare. Risk aversion magnifies but does not motivate this result; even assuming risk-neutrality, individuals
ex ante are made better off when firms take all efficient precautions to avoid accidents." Id at 843-44.
34. E.g., TIDMARSH, supra note 31, § 1.03(3].
35. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 780 (8th ed. 2011).
36. Id. at 785.
37. See TIDMARSH, supra note 31, § 1.03[4].
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 32; David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions. What Defendants
Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000).
40. TIDMARSH, supra note 31, § 1.03[4].
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at a certain amount, and markets can value the company without the drag of litigation
risk."41
5. Ensuring the Fair Treatment of Victims
While the first four rationales for using class actions seek to ensure the proper
level of investment in safety and litigation, the final goal "is the promise of providing
an adequate remedy to a large number of victims."42 Class actions ensure that victims
are treated fairly in three ways: through the text of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure43 and by avoiding the problems of horizontal inequity" and temporal
inequity. Horizontal inequity is characterized by litigants with similar claims and
injuries receiving drastically variable awards. There are two types of temporal
inequity. The first type occurs when a defendant has limited assets and the early-
filing plaintiffs served will deplete those assets to the point where later-filing
plaintiffs are denied any recovery because the defendant is bankrupt. The second
type occurs in the context of injunctions, where various plaintiffs prefer different
injunctions. The defendant cannot simultaneously comply with all of the options, so
if a court allows a later-filing plaintiffs case to proceed, then that plaintiff can deny
an earlier-filing plaintiff of a hard-fought victory or force the defendant to comply
with multiple injunctions, regardless of whether the costs are prohibitive. Class
actions solve issues of horizontal and temporal inequity by preventing variability in
awards or by creating a single injunction to represent all interested claimants'
competing interests.
B. A BriefHistory ofAdequacy ofRepresentation in Class Action Lawsuits
In any class action, a group of class representatives is appointed to represent the
interests of those-"absent class members"-not taking an active part in the
litigation. Indeed, "[c]lass actions assume absent class members."AS Absent class
members are informed "they need not show up in the courthouse, although they may
if they choose."46 Furthermore, they are told that once the court's decision becomes
final, they will be bound by it, forgoing "any and all right to protest the resolution of
their claims by the class action court or to bring an individual proceeding on the
claims resolved by the class suit."A7 These conditions, unique to class actions and
not adhering in individual litigation, present a specific constitutional challenge that,
if not reexamined in a significant way, will continue to hamper the use of class actions
41. Id.
42. Id. § 1.03[6], at 19.
43. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4) ("[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.").
44. See e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, The Predictability ofJuries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375
(2011).
45. Susan P. Koniak, How Like A Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate
Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787, 1787 (2004).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1788.
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to achieve justice and efficiency for litigants. The current state of Supreme Court
jurisprudence-as embodied by the paradigmatic example of asbestos litigation-has
raised the bar to satisfy the requirement of adequate representation to a nearly
insurmountable height, and the Court's recent decision in Knowles has made it clear
that the Supreme Court does not intend to resolve the uncertainty created by
Amchem's unrealistic standard any time soon.
The modem class action is embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as revised in 1966.48 Rule 23 also serves as the basis for all state class
action rules, which are modeled after it.49 Rule 23 prescribes as a prerequisite for
class certification that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class."50 "The bridge spanning the gulf between the interests of
class members and the actions of the class representative and class counsel is the
doctrine of adequate representation." 51 Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were first enacted in 1938, only two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court have
squarely dealt with the issue of adequate representation in class actions.52 In the first
of these cases, the United States Supreme Court found that there is a constitutional
dimension to adequacy of representation in class actions.53  The Constitution's
requirements are mostly stated at a high level of generality, and the due process
requirement of adequate representation is no exception.
In Hansberry, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether parties who were
bound by a judgment in previous litigation to which they were not parties were
deprived of their right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.54 The case was brought as a class action by Anna Lee and other
landowners in the Chicago area against Carl Hansberry, an African-American man,
to enforce a restrictive covenant preventing land from being sold or leased to people
of color.55 The restrictive covenant provided that it would not be in effect unless
owners of 95% of the frontage within the area to be bound by the covenant had signed
it. 56
Hansberry argued that the covenant had never become effective because the
landowners had failed to secure signatures from the owners of 95% of the frontage.57
The landowners responded by arguing that an earlier suit had found the covenant
effective, and that res judicata prevented Hansberry from litigating the same issue.58
Res judicata-the concept of finality for legal judgments-takes as its underlying
principle that "[i]t is just as important that there be a place to end as there should be
48. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
49. See Koniak, supra note 45, at 1788.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
51. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy ofRepresentation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 151 (2009).
52. See Aichem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
53. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40.
54. Id at 37.
55. Id at 37-38.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Id.
58. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
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a place to begin litigation." 59 The law requires finality in legal judgments in order to
make the legal system fair and effective, and so that people do not relitigate the same
claims over and over. In Hansberry, the landowners argued that because they had
already litigated the issue of whether the covenant was in force-whether it had been
signed by the required percentage of residents-then Carl Hansberry was precluded
by res judicata from raising that question again.
A trial on the merits between Hansberry and the landowners as to the validity of
the covenant revealed that only about 54% of the owners of the frontage had signed
the covenant. 60 The trial court nevertheless held in favor of the landowners, having
found that the issue of whether the covenant was valid was res judicata-meaning
Hansberry was precluded from raising the same claim since it had already been
litigated by the landowners in a previous case. 61 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Illinois found that the landowners who had signed the restrictive covenant constituted
a class in the prior litigation; therefore, as a class once again, they were bound by res
judicata to the former holding, which had found that the signature requirement had
been satisfied.62
In reversing the Supreme Court of Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a
constitutional rule of adequacy of representation in the class action context: A party
is not bound by res judicata from a previous class action if the party was not
adequately represented at the prior proceeding.6 3  To place its holding in
constitutional terms, the Court stated that "there has been a failure of due process
only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures
the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."64 A broad
consequence of the Court's holding is that inadequately represented class members
can pursue their claims in other litigation, free of any preclusive consequences of the
class judgment. Conversely, when the representation is adequate, a class judgment
does preclude further litigation of the class members' claims.
In the more recent case in which the Supreme Court has confronted adequate
representation issues in class actions head on, the Court considered the legitimacy
under Rule 2365 of using class certification for the purpose of a global settlement
59. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
60. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38; but see JAY TIDMARSH, The Story ofHansberry: The Rise ofthe Modern
Class Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 233, 265-67 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (noting the
uncertainty of whether the requisite 95% of the frontage had signed the covenant rather than the 54% figure
consistently cited by the defense in the litigation). According to Professor Tidmarsh, "[o]n at least one possible
construction of the covenant, the requisite 95% had signed-or, put differently, the plaintiffs had a credible
argument that the covenant was effective. The notion that only 54% of the frontage had signed-an important
part of the Hansberry lore-is demonstrably false." Id. Professor Tidmarsh's extensive study of the primary
sources containing signatures to the covenant revealed a number of ambiguities. He concluded that resolving
"all the ambiguities in the way most favorable to the plaintiffs, 96.6% of the frontage had signed and the
covenant was valid." Id. Resolving "all ambiguities in the way most favorable to the defendants, 71.4% of the
frontage had signed and the covenant was invalid." Id.
61. See Hansberry,311 U.S. at 38.
62. See id. at 39-40.
63. See id. at 44.
64. Id at 42.
65. FED. R. Civ. P.
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binding both current and future asbestos-related claims. 66 In 1990, in response to an
asbestos-litigation crisis resulting in "a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s,"67
Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed a special Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation to provide a report and recommendations.68 The report recognized in no
uncertain terms the most intolerable aspects of asbestos litigation:
[D]ockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays
are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over;
transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one;
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future
claimants may lose altogether. 69
The report's conclusion was that real reform required federal legislation providing a
national dispute-resolution scheme for asbestos injuries.70 Lacking any
congressional response, federal courts-"lacking authority to replace state tort
systems with a national toxic tort compensation regime"-tried to work within the
bounds of the procedural devices available to improve judicial management of
asbestos litigation in federal courts.7 1 Among the tools available to federal courts
was the ability to transfer all asbestos claims that had been filed but not yet tried to a
single district court.72
In a settlement class action such as the one proposed for certification in Amchem,
the parties come together to negotiate a resolution to the dispute without intending to
litigate. The proposed settlement in this case evolved after the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all asbestos cases into the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. After extensive negotiations, counsel for a class of people exposed to
asbestos products and counsel representing a group of twenty former asbestos
product manufacturers came to an agreement to resolve both present and future
claims of asbestos-related injury.73 Not intending to litigate, the settling parties
presented the District Court-all on the same day-"a complaint, an answer, a
proposed settlement agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class
certification." 74
A primary motivation for the manufacturers to settle was that the global
settlement would limit their liability to the amount of funds placed into the settlement
and would preclude future litigation on the part of those "exposure only" plaintiffs
66. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
67. Id. at 598 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 2-3 (Mar. 1991))
68. Id. at 597-98.
69. Id. at 598 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 599.
72. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599
73. See id. at 597.
74. Id. at 601-02 (the joint motion for conditional class certification was conditioned upon separate
litigation instituted by the defendant asbestos manufacturers against their insurers seeking a declaratory
judgment holding the insurers liable for the costs of the settlement).
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whose injuries had not yet manifested. Toward that end, the proposed class
consisted of:
all persons who had not filed an asbestos-related lawsuit against [one or
more of the asbestos manufacturers] as of the date the class action
commenced, but who (1) had been exposed-occupationally or through
the occupational exposure of a spouse or household member-to asbestos
or products containing asbestos attributable to [one or more of the
manufacturers], or (2) whose spouse or family member had been so
exposed.76
Duly motivated to preclude future liability to the greatest extent possible, the
defendants focused settlement talks on disposing of future asbestos claims not yet in
litigation.77  Such a broadly composed class presents inherent difficulties, as
"[u]ntold numbers of individuals may fall within this description." Further
compounding this difficulty, "[t]he complaint delineated no subclasses; all named
plaintiffs were designated as representatives of the class as a whole."79 Ultimately,
the negotiations were characterized by class counsel endeavoring to represent the
interests of future claimants with whom those lawyers did not yet have an attorney-
client relationship.o
The stipulation of settlement filed with the District Court provided a schedule of
payments to compensate class members "who meet defined asbestos-exposure and
medical requirements." 8' Those objecting to the proposed settlement raised a number
of concerns. A principal objection was that future plaintiffs-those without currently
compensable conditions-were severely and unfairly disadvantaged by the
settlement because it failed to adjust for inflation, to account for changes in medical
understanding over time, and to compensate future plaintiffs as generously as current
plaintiffs.82 Regarding adequacy of representation, "[o]bjectors maintained that class
75. See id. at 601.
76. Id. at 602.
77. See id at 601.
78. Id. at 602.
79. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603.
80. See id at 601.
81. Id. at 603-04 ("The stipulation describes four categories of compensable disease: mesothelioma; lung
cancer; certain 'other cancers' (colon-rectal, laryngeal, esophageal, and stomach cancer); and 'non-malignant
conditions' (asbestosis and bilateral pleural thickening).") The stipulation also designated a range of damages
to be paid for each qualifying disease category, and provided that the defendants propose the level of
compensation to be paid to individual class members within the prescribed ranges. Id. For example,
mesothelioma claimants, as the highest compensated category, would be scheduled to receive between $20,000
and $200,000. Id. at 604. Additionally, the stipulation established procedures to resolve disputes regarding
medical diagnoses and compensation levels. Id. While the proposed settlement allowed compensation to exceed
the fixed ranges for "extraordinary" claims, it also placed numerical caps and dollar limits on such extraordinary
claims. Id. The settlement also capped the number of claims payable for each disease in a given year through
"case flow maximums." Id. Finally, the settlement would prevent class members from receiving any
compensation for certain claims, regardless of whether state law would otherwise recognize them. Id.
82. See id. at 606.
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counsel and class representatives had disqualifying conflicts of interest." The
District Court rejected the challenge to adequate representation, "[r]easoning that the
representative plaintiffs 'have a strong interest that recovery for all of the medical
categories be maximized because they may have claims in any, or several
categories,"' and ultimately finding "'no antagonism of interest between class
members with various medical conditions, or between persons with and without
currently manifest asbestos impairment."' 84  The District Court conditionally
certified the class as a 23(b)(3) opt-out class and class members were given the
opportunity to opt-out within three months.85
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the
certification, holding that the requirements of Rule 23-including the requirement of
adequate representation-had not been satisfied. 6 The Court of Appeals found
representation inadequate in large part because the proposed settlement "does more
than simply provide a general recovery fund. . . . [r]ather, it makes important
judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different kinds of plaintiffs,
decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over others."87 For the Third Circuit,
the "most salient" divergence of interests separated currently injured plaintiffs from
future-exposure-only-plaintiffs without manifest injuries at the time of the
settlement. Those protecting the interests of future plaintiffs would rationally
advocate for protection against inflation and provisions capable of altering the rights
of future plaintiffs depending upon changes made in science and medicine.89 By
contrast, current plaintiffs are more focused on achieving the highest possible payout
as soon as possible.90 These countervailing interests convinced the Third Circuit that
an undivided set of class representatives could not adequately protect the disparate
interests of current and future plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "the role settlement may play,
under existing Rule 23, in determining the propriety of class certification," ultimately
concluding that "[s]ettlement is relevant to a class certification." 91 In affirming the
Third Circuit's decision to vacate the certification order, the Supreme Court likewise
framed its opinion in terms of the elements of Rule 23-each of which must be
satisfied for class certification-that the proposed global settlement failed to satisfy
83. Id. at 607.
84. Id. at 608 (internal citations omitted).
85. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605-6. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ("A class action may be maintained if
Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: ... (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings
include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.").
86. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 610.
87. Id. at 630.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 630-31.
90. Id. at 631.
91. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).
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and borrowed heavily from the Third Circuit's reasoning. Nevertheless, had the court
opted to, it could have rejected class certification based entirely upon finding the
requirement of adequate representation unsatisfied in this context.
In discussing Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement of adequacy of representation, the
Court emphasized that the purpose of a Rule 23(a)(4) inquiry is "to uncover conflicts
of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent." 92 Without
difficulty, the Court held that class representatives could not adequately represent the
interests of absent class members when present and future class members had
conflicting interests: "for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous
immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs
in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future."" The Court
interpreted adequate representation to mean that a "'class representative must be part
of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class
members."' 94
Exploring the deficiencies of the majority's opinion in Amchem helps shed light
on why a better understanding of adequacy of representation is required before class
actions can be considered a serious procedural device for litigants. Justice Breyer's
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part illuminates the
shortcomings of the majority's opinion in two important respects. First, he argues
that the need for settlement in a mass tort case of this magnitude is greater than the
majority suggests and that the Court should not so easily upend the District Court's
decision to certify the class.95 Second, he questions the Court's determination of
adequacy of representation when the district court rejected any objections and the
Court of Appeals did not consider the issue.96 In fleshing out his criticism of the
determination of adequate representation, Justice Breyer delves into the competing
interests between current plaintiffs and future plaintiffs to see how they may have
balanced out.97
Justice Breyer's argument stressing the need for a settlement for asbestos claims
tracks the argument made in this Note for a more liberal approach to the requirement
of adequacy of representation to maximize justice and efficiency for litigants.
Among the facts Justice Breyer enumerates concerning asbestos litigation supporting
this argument are that individual asbestos filings "have taken up more than 6% of all
federal civil filings in one recent year, and are subject to a delay that is twice that of
other civil suits."98 He also notes that of "each asbestos litigation dollar, 61 cents is
consumed in transaction costs ... .Only 39 cents were paid to the asbestos victims."99
"The law gives broad leeway to district courts in making class certification
92. Id. at 625.
93. Id. at 626.
94. Id at 625-26 (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See id at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See idat 629-30.
97. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
98. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 631 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 7, 10-11 (Mar. 1991)).
99. Id. at 632 (internal citations omitted).
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decisions, and their judgments are to be reviewed by the court of appeals only for
abuse of discretion."' 00 Justice Breyer argues that the district court is the proper
forum to engage in the intense and complex factual inquiry that leads to a
determination of whether the requirement of adequate representation has been
satisfied or not. Since the district court is "far more familiar with the issues and
litigants than is a court of appeals or [the Supreme Court]" it has 'broad power and
discretion .. . with respect to matters involving the certification' of class actions."101
In this case, "the District Court's certification decision rests upon more than 300
findings of fact reached after five weeks of comprehensive hearings." 02 in
approving the settlement, the District Court "concluded that it improved the
plaintiffs' chances of compensation and reduced total legal fees and other transaction
costs by a significant amount."10 3 "The court believed the settlement would create a
compensation system that would make more money available for plaintiffs who later
develop serious illnesses." 04
One of the reasons Justice Breyer notes for disagreeing with the majority's
discussion of adequacy of representation is the opinion's failure to take into
consideration the benefits to future plaintiffs that were unavailable to current
plaintiffs, such that the settlement could be viewed as a fair compromise of each
group's interests.10 5 Justice Breyer acknowledges that "'[w]hat constitutes adequate
representation is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of each
case."' 106 He mentions the majority's use of the lack of an inflation adjustment as
evidence of inadequate representation for future plaintiffs. He argues that inflation
adjustment "might not be as valuable as the majority assumes if most plaintiffs are
old and not worried about receiving compensation decades from now.""0 7 What is
important, according to Justice Breyer, is that the Supreme Court is "poorly situated
to resolve" such issues from a cold record, whereas the District Court considered such
arguments and dismissed them after careful consideration.los "The difficulties
inherent in both knowing and understanding the vast number of relevant individual
fact-based determinations here counsel heavily in favor of deference to district court
100. Id at 630.
101. Id at 630 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979)).
102. Id. at 630.
103. Id. at 633; see also note 4 and accompanying text.
104. Amchem 521 U.S. at 633 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. See id. at 638 ("The District Court concluded that future plaintiffs receive a significant value from the
settlement due to a variety of its items that benefit future plaintiffs, such as: (1) tolling the statute of limitations
so that class members will no longer be forced to file premature lawsuits or risk their claims being time-barred;
(2) waiver of defenses to liability; (3) payment of claims, if and when members become sick, pursuant to the
settlement's compensation standards, which avoids the uncertainties, long delays and high transaction costs
[including attorney's fees] of the tort system; (4) some assurance that there will be funds available if and when
they get sick, based on the finding that each defendant has shown an ability to fund the payment of all qualifying
claims under the settlement; and (5) the right to additional compensation if cancer develops (many settlements
for plaintiffs with noncancerous conditions bar such additional claims.") (internal citations omitted).
106. Id. at 637 (quoting 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765, at 271 (2d ed. 1982)).
107. Id. at 638.
108. Id.
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decisionmaking in Rule 23 decisions."109 As a result, Justice Breyer advocates
vacating the judgment and remanding the case so that the lower courts can analyze
the factual questions involved in certification. 110
The majority's opinion fails entirely to discuss certain details of the settlement
that may benefit future plaintiffs more than the majority suggests.' 1 The majority
essentially neglected to entertain any notion that competing interests between current
and future plaintiffs could satisfy the requirement of adequate representation,
regardless of the factual circumstances of the case. The majority misunderstands a
critical issue inherent in all class actions: there will always be conflicting interests
among class members. When this fact of class actions is understood, then the
problem can be rephrased from "are there conflicting interests?" to "are the conflicts
so bad that courts should be unwilling to tolerate them?"
C. The Class Action Fairness Act of2005
In 2005, Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") to
increase class action litigants' access to federal courts.1 12 The Act itself tells a story
about what is good and bad about class actions, and is therefore helpful to
understanding the need for a rulemaking solution to the problem of adequacy of
representation. In the text of the law, Congress recognized that "[c]lass action
lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the
fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the
claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly
caused harm.""l3 However, Congress specifically found that widespread "abuses of
the class action device" in state courts had "harmed class members with legitimate
claims and defendants that ha[d] acted responsibly."1 14  Among the abuses
specifically mentioned in the Act are disproportionately large class counsel fees with
respect to class member compensation as well as disparate and unjustified awards for
some plaintiffs and not others." 5  Furthermore, Congress found that, in general,
"[a]buses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction . . . in that State and
local courts are . . . keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court." 1 6
The purpose of the Act is to "assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members
with legitimate claims" while "restor[ing] the intent of the framers . .. by providing
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction" and "benefit[ing] society by encouraging innovation and
lowering consumer prices." 
1 7
109. Id. at 639.
110. See id. at 641.
111. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
113. Id. § 2(a)(1).
114. Id. § 2(a)(2), (2)(A).
115. Id. § 2(a)(3)(AY ).
116. Id. § 2(a)(4), (4)(A).
117. Id. § 2(b).
2013-14]1 179
Journal of Legislation
CAFA increased class action access to federal courts by amending federal district
court jurisdiction." 8  The new section 1332(d) gives district courts original
jurisdiction based upon the amount in controversy and citizenship of the parties."
1 9
Specifically, district courts have original jurisdiction when "the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs" and when
"any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant."l 20 The Act further specifies that the claims of all class members must be
aggregated to determine whether the five million dollar threshold is met for federal
jurisdiction.121
Despite significantly increasing access to federal courts for putative class
actions, Congress included two exceptions in which federal district courts may or
should decline jurisdiction.122  Under section 1332(d)(3)'s "interests of justice"
exception:
[a] district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality
of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction... over a class action
in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants
are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.123
Whereas section 1332(d)(3) grants a district court discretion in determining whether
to exercise jurisdiction over a class action, section 1332(d)(4) outlines two
circumstances in which a district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction. The
"local controversy" exception codified in section 1332(d)(4)(A) requires a district
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when more than two-thirds of the class
members in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed; at least one defendant "from whom significant relief is sought by members of
the plaintiff class" and "whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the
claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class" is a citizen of the State in which the
118. See § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006)). ("The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which-(A) any member of a class of
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign
state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state.").
119. See id.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (2)(A) (2006).
121. Id. § 1332(d)(6).
122. Id. § 1332(d)(3-(4).
123. Id. § 1332(d)(3); see also § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F) (providing that the District Court, in making a
determination to decline to exercise jurisdiction, must consider a number of factors, including whether the
claims involve state or interstate matters; whether the claims will be governed by the laws of the State in which
the action was originally filed or the laws of another state; whether the class action was pleaded in a manner
suggesting a desire to avoid Federal jurisdiction; whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; the citizenship of the plaintiff class and
whether the class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and whether, during a three year period
preceding the filing of the current class action, one or more other class actions were filed asserting the same or
similar claims).
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action was originally filed; the principal injuries were incurred in the State in which
the action was originally filed; and where no other class action alleging similar facts
was filed in the three years prior to the commencement of the current class action. 124
Alternatively, a district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction under the "home
state" exception when "two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which
the action was originally filed."l 25
In order to facilitate increased access to federal courts, CAFA includes a broad
right for defendants to remove interstate class actions to federal court. 126 CAFA
permits removal to federal court "without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen
of the State in which the action is brought," and permits any defendant to remove the
case to federal court, regardless of unanimity of consent among defendants. 2 7 The
right of removal is exercised in accordance with section 1446, with the caveat that in
class actions defendants are not bound by the 1-year limitation under section
1446(b).128 In order to effect removal, defendants must file a notice of removal
"containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a
copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants
in such action." 129
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
The law of evidence requires expert testimony to be "reliable."" 0 The rule
incorporates a "gatekeeper" function for judges to decide whether what an expert
proposes to say is reliable or not, despite the fact that judges are not necessarily well-
equipped to do so. A judge making a determination of whether expert testimony is
reliable is not unlike a judge making a determination of adequacy of representation
of a putative class for the purpose of class certification. The U.S. Supreme Court
dealt with the inherent difficulty facing judges tasked with determining the reliability
of expert witnesses in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' Ultimately,
the Court expounded five "Daubert" factors to help a trial judge faced with the task
of assessing the reliability of a scientific theory or technique. A judge in such a
situation should ask (1) whether the technique "can be (and has been) tested"; (2)
whether it has been "subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) "the known or
potential rate of error" of the theory or technique; (4) "the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (5) "general acceptance" in
124. See id. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
125. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
126. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4, 12 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006)).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006).
128. See id.
129. Id. § 1446(a).
130. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.").
131. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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the relevant scientific community." 32
Similarly, the Copyright Act of 1976' 3 directs courts confronted with a fair use
defense to apply a four-factor test in determining "whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use."134 Courts are to consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 35
This Note makes the argument that courts should deal with adequacy of
representation in the same way that trial judges deal with determining the reliability
of expert testimony and whether a defendant has made out a claim of fair use.
Determining whether adequacy of representation is met in a putative class action is
more art than science, and the way in which district courts evaluate a putative class
needs to reflect this need for flexibility if class actions are going to become a viable
procedural device for social benefit. Toward that end, courts should deal with
adequacy of representation through a fact-intensive inquiry on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account a number of factors, and ultimately, deciding in the aggregate
how those factors balance out against one another.
In fashioning such an approach, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure can rely upon principles gleaned from the work of scholars and
traditional western philosophical doctrines and distilled into a multi-factor test. This
approach takes as a premise that conflicts of interest are inevitable in class actions,
and that the goal should be to manage them. Thus, the purpose of each factor is to
help a judge determine whether the conflicts presented by a putative class are so bad
that the court should be unwilling to tolerate them because doing so would frustrate
the interests of justice. The public policy underlying CAFA is also intended to tint
the lens through which a judge evaluates each factor in the approach.
The argument made by this Note is that the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should amend Rule 23 to add four subparts-(A)-(D)-to
Rule 23(a)(4), to establish a multi-factor balancing test for judges to use when
determining adequacy issues. Rule 23(a)(4) would be amended to add the following
factors, which are pertinent in determining whether adequacy is satisfied. The first
factor is based upon the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The second factor can be
justified through a utility-maximizing utilitarian rationale. The third factor draws
upon Kantian ethics, while the fourth relies on a straightforward application of
Professor Tidmarsh's "do no harm" principle. It is important to note at the outset
that this is not intended to be an exhaustive list of factors that judges could use in
deciding questions of adequacy of representation. Instead, the functional approach
132. Id. at 593-94.
133. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended throughout title 17 of the U.S.C.).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
135. Id. § 107(1)-(4).
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that follows is intended to be a preliminary consideration of how judges might look
at the question of adequacy of representation in class actions differently.
A. Proposed Rule 23(a) (4) (A): Whether putative class members, not knowing how
a particular action in the litigation would affect them, would nevertheless consent
to the action taken by class counsel or the class representative(s).
In 1971, John Rawls published A Theory ofJustice, which helped create a revival
in political philosophy, a field long dominated by utilitarian thinking. His goal was
to present a conception of justice which "generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant."l 36 Rather than thinking of the social contract as one to enter a
given society or form a particular government, Rawls wanted to use the concept of a
social contract and the forming of an original agreement to define the basic structures
of institutions in a just society.' 37 Recognizing justice as the first virtue of social
institutions, Rawls was concerned with the role that justice plays in a well-ordered
society.138 He wanted his theory to serve as an organizing tool to show how free and
equal persons could agree upon a fair system of cooperation.139 Rawls's theory can
be analogized to the context of adequacy of representation in class actions to provide
insight into how a judge should analyze adequacy issues.
The crux of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is his concept of the original
position. The original position is a hypothetical initial position from which people
are to determine the basic structure of society.14 0 "In justice as fairness the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the
social contract."1 41 Rawls believes that by placing restrictions on the knowledge of
those in the original position, people will then agree to the same basic principles to
establish "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." 42
The restrictions of the original position place the choosers behind a veil of
ignorance in which they have no knowledge of their place in society, class position
or social status, fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, intelligence,
strength, conceptions of the good or special psychological propensities.143 The
justification for the veil of ignorance is simple: "[s]ince all are similarly situated and
no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain."'" By restricting the information
available to parties in the original position, the veil acts to eliminate reasonable
pluralism and prevent unfair bargaining advantages and leverage, creating fair




140. See id. at 11-12.
141. Id. at 12.
142. RAWLS, supra note 136, at 7.




conditions for people to come to mutual agreement.
Just as Rawls used the original position as an intuition pump to help people agree
upon certain facts of well-ordered social institutions, so too can the thought
experiment be used by a judge to determine whether all class members are getting a
fair shake in the litigation. The original position can be used as a proxy for
determining the fairness and adequacy of class member treatment by positing
whether someone in the original position would find adequacy of representation
satisfied. A judge can place himself behind a veil of ignorance and confront the
question of whether adequacy of representation is satisfied. Keeping in mind that the
process is more art than science, the judge can weigh the various interests that class
members would have and ultimately decide whether the original position weighs in
favor of finding adequacy satisfied or not.
Once people are in the original position and behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls
believes that, as rational actors, people will accept what he refers to as the "difference
principle." As restated, the difference principle posits that social and economic
inequalities "are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society."l 45 The driving force behind the difference principle is to modify the
distribution of social inequalities to remove the differential effects of luck. Like
Rawls's original position, the difference principle can be extrapolated to the context
of adequacy in class actions. Judges can ask whether particular actions within the
litigation conform to the difference principle by benefitting specific class members.
When there is an apparent conflict between the interests of class members, judges
can ask whether the inequality that would result from favoring the interests of some
class members over others will result in favoring the least well off among them,
where one's position as well off or not is measured in terms of their position in the
litigation.
Rawls places a constraint on individuals in the original position that states that
they are rational. As rational agents, those in the original position choose the most
efficient means to their ends. The constraint is motivated by the maximin principle,
which Rawls wants to govern the eventual social contract that people would enter
into. By ensuring that individuals are rational, Rawls can assume that they will adopt
the maximin principle of choice, which dictates that when choosing an action from
alternatives, never choose any action unless its worst outcome is at least as good as
the worst outcome of any of the other alternatives. The maximin principle minimizes
the risk individuals take when deciding the rules that will be included in the social
contract. Rawls believes the maximin principle to be necessary for choosing a just
social contract because it is a one-off choice-choosing once in order to bind the
members of society in perpetuity. Rawls argues people will adopt the maximin
principle as a safeguard in the event they end up in an unfavorable situation in the
resulting society. Class litigation can also be seen as a one-off choice, as class
members are bound by the litigation if they have been adequately represented. As
Rawls put it, "an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even
145. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42-43 (Erin Kelly ed., 2003).
184 [Vol. 40:1
A Functional Approach to Adequacy ofRepresentation
greater injustice."l 46 Such ideas should permeate the thoughts of judges confronted
with adequacy of representation challenges, and it is possible that Rawls's work can
help them to do so.
In applying this proposed factor, a district court judge can combine Rawls's veil
of ignorance with the difference principle and the maximin principle in determining
whether a particular decision affecting a putative class weighs in favor of finding
adequate representation or not. The difference principle and the maximin principle
provide indicia for the reasonableness of any given action in class litigation by
demonstrating the effects of the action over the entire class. The principles can serve
as a proxy for a district judge to aid in conducting Rawls's thought experiment and
applying the factor. With respect to any decision in class litigation, a judge
determining the adequacy of representation question can hypothetically place the
class representatives, class counsel, and all class members behind the veil of
ignorance so that they do not know which position they will occupy in the class
action. If the action is one in which those behind the veil would consent to, then the
factor tilts the balance in favor of finding representation adequate.
B. Proposed Rule 23(a) (4) (B): Whether certification increases net social benefit
by augmenting the net recovery to the class. Net recovery can be measured by an
increase in the total compensation delivered to the class itself or by an increase in
the total number ofplaintiffs compensated, assuming the latter increase does not
decrease the value of other class members' claims.
An ethical theory provides a framework that can be used to determine what is
morally right and morally wrong regarding human action and human character. An
adequate ethical theory must typically do two things. First, it must have implications
that are largely reconcilable with our experience of moral life, and second, it must
provide effective guidance where it is most needed-in those situations where
substantial moral considerations can be advanced on both sides of an issue. It should
illuminate our moral judgment precisely where it is expected to falter-in the face of
moral dilemmas.
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory dictating how people should
behave.147  It maintains that the rightness and wrongness of human action is
exclusively a function of the goodness and badness of the consequences resulting
directly or indirectly from that action. As a consequentialist theory, utilitarianism is
forward-looking, concerned only with the consequences of future actions rather than
taking into account past action. John Stuart Mill developed the theory of
Utilitarianism to provide people with a universal guide for action, applying to all
actions committed by every individual. Mill argues that moral actions can be defined
as those that bring about the best possible consequences amongst all alternatives, and
that the best consequences will always coincide with whatever action produces the
greatest amount of happiness. "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals
'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion
146. See RAWLS, supra note 136, at 4.
147. See generally, JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., 2001).
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as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness."l 48
The theory differs from other philosophical arguments in that it employs a
formula or "calculus" to measure pleasures and pains and therefore determine moral
action. Hedonic values represent the amount of pleasure resulting from an action,
while doloric values represent the amount of pain resulting from an action. Taking
the hedonic value and subtracting from it the doloric value of an individual action
yields the utility of that act, which corresponds to its overall pleasure rating. The
utility of action is a measure of the balance of the total amount of pleasure over the
total amount of pain that would result if the given action were to take place. Classical
utilitarianism's prescription for action is that an individual action, "A", is morally
right if and only if there is no alternative-another action available to the person
performing "A" at that time-to "A", "B", such that the utility of "B" is greater than
the utility of "A".
Judges engaged in determining whether a putative class has satisfied the
adequacy standard are forced to balance the consequences that would result from
particular actions within litigation in the same way that utilitarianism requires.
Framing the inquiry in terms of the utility of the actions and their alternatives would
benefit a judge's approach to the standard of adequacy. A judge can ask whether
certifying a putative class will maximize utility, thus benefitting the most participants
of the litigation as much as possible.
At the outset, it should be clarified that this factor does not refer to negative value
class actions, in which it is not entirely clear that increasing the aggregate number of
plaintiffs compensated is a good thing when doing so simultaneously decreases the
value of other class members' claims. Nevertheless, in the broader scheme of
whether to certify a class or not, a judge can productively posit the question of
whether finding adequate representation will allow-in aggregate-more plaintiffs
to litigate than would otherwise be possible. If the net recovery to the plaintiffs
increases as a result of an action in litigation, then it should be clear that adequate
representation is satisfied. Situations in which some individuals may not be able to
litigate would include reasons such as the statute of limitations, the cost of individual
litigation in terms of requiring an attorney to accept the case, and potential issues of
proof with respect to an individual's claim that would make the case less worthwhile
to bring individually. If certifying the class will enable more plaintiffs with facially
credible claims to litigate, then utility is increased through certification.
This factor can also be asked inversely: would finding representation inadequate
prevent some class members from receiving any recovery at all? Eliminating certain
issues such as a statute of limitations defense or issues of proof can allow litigants
with cognizable claims to recover whereas they may not have prevailed in individual
litigation. This utilitarian-based factor is intended to promote the class action goal
of increased efficiency in litigation through lowering transaction costs. Transaction
costs can play an extremely prominent role in preventing individuals with worthwhile
and compensable claims from seeing any recovery. By litigating as a class,
148. Id. at 7.
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transaction costs can be reduced and the pie from which each litigant's piece is cut
can get bigger. A finding that certification will increase the number of plaintiffs that
will achieve some recovery than would occur through individual litigation promotes
finding representation adequate.
This factor is directly relevant to the deficiencies in the majority's opinion in
Amchem. The Court failed to take into consideration the vast number of putative
plaintiffs that would have been able to recover through the global class settlement
that would not otherwise have been able to recover as a result of depleted funds, an
inability to prove their claims, or the tolling of the statute of limitations.
C. Proposed Rule 23(a) (4) (C): The extent to which the actions of class counsel
and class representative(s) reflect an overweening self-interest in maximizing their
relative advantages to the detriment ofputative or absent class members.
Regarded by many as the greatest modem philosopher, Immanuel Kant focused
his ethical theory on human autonomy as the key to understanding the natural world
and human experience. His theory was intended to capture a number of common
themes in moral reasoning. 149 First, moral reasons are the most important kind of
reasons and override all other reasons for acting. Second, the motive behind an action
is the key determinant of its moral normative status. Third, each person deserves to
be treated with dignity and respect. Finally, Kantianism was designed to reflect that
it is morally wrong to take advantage of the forbearance of others.
The centerpiece of Kantianism is Kant's categorical imperative. Kant reasoned
that morality dictates specific action by telling people how they ought to act in certain
situations. Morality thus issues commands or orders, which can be expressed by
imperatives. Because morality for Kant overrides all other reasons for acting, its
demands are unconditional and therefore must be expressed by categorical
imperatives. Kant's categorical imperative can be stated in a variety of ultimately
equivalent ways, each differing only with respect to the aspect of our moral thinking
it emphasizes. For the purpose of extrapolating Kant's categorical imperative to
adequacy of representation in class actions, the most helpful formulation is: "[a]ct in
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end." 5 0 Kant argued "man ... exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for
arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions . . . always be viewed at
the same time as an end."15 1 This form of the categorical imperative states that
people should refrain from using others as a means to achieve their own ends, and it
is intended to respect the dignity and autonomy of all people. Judges can use Kant's
categorical imperative to ask whether a particular action in litigation would result in
absent class members being used as means to an end.
This factor operates on a sliding scale, as all actions can be construed in terms of
149. See generally, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans.,
Harper Perennial Modem Thought ed. 2009).
150. Id. at 96.
151. Id. at 95.
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self-interest, with some reflecting more than others. A negative value class action
may be the paradigmatic example of class counsel maximizing relative advantages to
the detriment of the class. A case in which class counsel reaps millions in attorneys'
fees while the class recovers nothing-or, in the most egregious cases, when class
members actually owe money as part of the settlement-is the clearest example of
this factor weighing against certification. If the dynamic between the class
representatives and class counsel on the one hand and the absent class members on
the other suggests that the presence of the absent class members in the litigation is
only for the purpose of enhancing the claims and monetary compensation of the class
representatives and class counsel, then this factor weighs against certification. This
factor is directly aimed at determining the extent of conflict between class members,
and applies Kant's categorical imperative as a metric for determining when conflicts
are too bad to tolerate.
D. Proposed Rule 23(a)(4)(D): Whether class members are no worse off by
litigating as a class than they would be if they had engaged in individual
litigation 152
Among recent attempts to provide a clearer metric for determining adequate
representation in class actions is Professor Tidmarsh's "do no harm" principle, which
can be used as a factor in the functional approach outlined in this Note. Similar to
the goal of this Note, Professor Tidmarsh has set out to "defend[] a test for
determining adequate representation that navigates between the reality of internal
class conflict and the benefits of class actions."1 53
The final factor is a straightforward application of Professor Tidmarsh's "do no
harm" principle. The main distinction to be drawn between his approach and the one
advanced here is that while he advances the "do no harm" principle as the only metric
in determining adequate representation, the multi-factor approach advocated in this
Note favors using Professor Tidmarsh's metric as just one of a number of metrics in
finding whether adequate representation is satisfied under a totality of the
circumstances.
His approach-the "do no harm" principle-posits that "[r]epresentation by
class representatives and counsel is adequate if, and only if, the representation makes
class members no worse off than they would have been if they had engaged in
individual litigation." 54 Stated in slightly different terms: "'adequate representation'
with respect to a class member exists when the actions of the class representative and
class counsel place that class member in no worse a position than the class member
would have occupied by retaining individual control of her litigation." 5 5
As Professor Tidmarsh has pointed out, "adequate representation is not perfect
152. For a detailed analysis of how to apply the "do no harm" principle, see Tidmarsh, supra note 51, at
1175-80.
153. Id. at 1175.
154. Id at 1139.
155. Id at 1175.
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representation."1 56 This is a central feature of the principle and it reveals a crucial
implication of its application: the "do no harm" principle does not require that each
class member's recovery is maximized; it simply requires that the class representative
and class counsel do no worse for each individual class member than the class
member would have done individually.15 7 This implication is crucial specifically for
the reason that "a range of actions are likely to be deemed adequate; the class
representative and class counsel need not select the action that best advances the
interests of each class member."158  Professor Tidmarsh acknowledges the
importance of this fact for making the principle workable in practice, noting that the
nearly inevitable tensions that will exist within any class make it unlikely that class
representatives and class counsel can consistently select actions that best advance the
interests of each class member. 159 Ultimately, "[t]he 'do no harm' principle is
designed as a check on self-interested behavior, not as a principle that chooses actions
based on the greatest good of a class member or even of the class as a whole."1 60
A final aspect of Professor Tidmarsh's principle that carries over to the multi-
factor approach suggested in this Note is that the application of the principle requires
"constant recalculation of adequate representation as a class action proceeds."16'
Toward that end, after filing a class action, "a prima facie showing of adequate
representation can be made" based upon the multi-factor test, and then again later as
new actions in the litigation place adequate representation at issue. 162
IV. CONCLUSION
The requirement of adequate representation is the cornerstone of the entire class
action rule embodied in Rule 23.163 It is hard to imagine how to construct a rule for
class actions without a clear definition and understanding of what adequate
representation is, and yet that is precisely the current state of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the wake of Amchem.164 Amchem appears to stand for the
proposition that conflicts of interest among class members precludes the possibility
of adequate representation.165 Until the standard of adequate representation is
clarified, then any underlying CAFA issues presented to the Court will remain
secondary and class action practice will not improve. The Supreme Court had an
opportunity to say something meaningful about adequate representation in
Knowles1 66 and declined to do so. With the Supreme Court on the sidelines, a
156. Id. at 1179.
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rulemaking solution appears necessary to give effect to Congress's legislative intent
in enacting CAFA and in making class actions a viable procedural device for social
benefit. Toward that end, this Note outlined a functional approach to adequate
representation that is realistic about the difficulties presented by class litigation and
navigating the inevitable conflicting interests of class members.
